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Debt cycles, instability and fiscal rules:  
a Godley-Minsky model 
 
1. Introduction 
 
Wynne Godley and Hyman Minsky were two macroeconomists who ‘saw the crisis 
coming’.1 In 1999 Godley published his well-known article on the ‘seven unsustainable 
processes’ in the US economy (Godley, 1999). In this article he argued that the rising 
indebtedness of the US private sector was unsustainable and, therefore, private 
expenditures could not be considered as a source of steady growth in the medium run. He 
also pointed to the unsustainability of the rising US net foreign indebtedness. Using a 
stock-flow consistent analytical framework, Godley argued that without a change in fiscal 
policy stance or an important rise in net exports, the US economy was doomed to witness 
a severe recession and a sharp rise in unemployment. These warnings were repeated in his 
publications as a head of the Levy Economics Institute’s macro-modelling team (see, e.g. 
Godley, 2003, 2005; Godley et al., 2005). The 2007-9 crisis verified Godley’s fears: the US 
economy contracted sharply and the unemployment rate increased substantially.2  
Minsky (1975, 1982, 2008) developed a theory that explains how indebtedness can 
increase in periods of tranquillity as a result of endogenous forces that reduce the desired 
margins of safety of economic units. This gradual reduction in the desired margins of 
safety was considered by Minsky as the reason behind the increasing financial fragility that 
accompanies economic expansion and periods of stability. According to his financial 
instability hypothesis, the increasing fragility makes the macro systems more prone to 
shocks that reduce the ability of borrowers to repay their debt. These shocks can lead to 
severe economic recessions. The processes described in Minsky’s analysis are broadly in 
line with the pre-crisis developments in the US and other advanced economies that 
ultimately led to the Great Recession.   
The emphasis that Godley and Minsky placed on financial relationships as sources of 
cycles and instability enabled them to provide some very important insights into the 
dynamics of modern macroeconomies. However, they did so from quite different angles. 
Godley concentrated more on the macroeconomic relationships between the private, the 
government and the foreign sector and postulated that in the medium to long run the 
fluctuations in financial balances and growth are driven by some exogenous stock-flow 
norms. Minsky, on the other hand, focused more on the relationships within the private 
sector (primarily on the financial relationships between firms and banks) and explained the 
macroeconomic fluctuations by considering endogenous changes in norms and valuations 
of risk.  
Although it is widely held that Godley’s and Minsky’s perspectives are both important 
for the explanation of macroeconomic dynamics, there is still a lack of a formal 
                                                 
1 See, for example, Whalen (2008), Wolf (2008), Bezemer (2010) and Wray (2011, 2012). 
2 According to Godley et al. (2007) and Zezza (2009), the slowdown of economic growth in 2001-2 was a first 
sign of the unsustainable processes in the US economy. However, a severe recession was then prevented due 
to accommodative fiscal and monetary policies.    
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framework that synthesises them. On the one hand, there is a large literature on formal 
Minskyan models that capture various dynamics related to Minsky’s financial instability 
hypothesis. Recent contributions to this literature include Ryoo (2010, 2013a), Chiarella 
and Di Guilmi (2011), Eggertsson and Krugman (2012), Passarella (2012), Sordi and 
Vercelli (2012), Keen (2013), Nikolaidi (2014) and Bhattacharya et al. (2015). However, 
none of these models include explicitly insights from Godley’s projection analyses. On the 
other hand, there are some theoretical stock-flow consistent models that utilise aspects of 
Godley’s projection approach, but make no explicit links to Minskyan dynamics (e.g. 
Godley and Lavoie, 2007; Martin, 2008; Leite, 2015).    
The purpose of this paper is to develop a simple macrodynamic model that makes a 
Godley-Minsky synthesis. The model concentrates on certain aspects of Godley’s and 
Minsky’s approaches that are deemed more important for a simplified explanation of debt 
cycles and instability in a national macroeconomy. The key features of the model and the 
principal results of the analysis are the following.  
First, as in Godley’s projection analyses, the model economy consists of three sectors: 
the private sector, the government sector and the foreign sector. This permits an explicit 
consideration of Godley’s financial balances approach that explains the interlinkages 
between these sectors and the resulting effects on debt accumulation and growth. 
Remarkably, Godley’s financial balances approach is broadly in line with Kalecki’s profit 
equation that was used by Minsky.  
Second, drawing on Godley, the private sector’s propensity to spend is driven by a 
stock-flow norm (the target net debt-to-income ratio). It is shown that, under certain 
conditions, the interaction between the propensity to spend and net private indebtedness 
generates cycles and instability. Instability is more likely when the propensity to spend 
responds strongly to deviations from the stock-flow norm. A paradox of debt result arises: 
the more the private sector and its lenders attempt to put net private indebtedness under 
control, by adjusting private expenditures, the more the net private debt ratio destabilises.      
Third, following Minsky, it is assumed that the stock-flow norm varies endogenously 
as a result of changes in the expectations and the conventions of borrowers and lenders 
during the economic cycle. It is shown that this endogeneity can give rise to Godley-
Minsky debt cycles and it is a source of instability. Instability is more likely when the 
stock-flow norm is highly sensitive to the economic cycle.   
Fourth, two different fiscal rules are introduced: a Maastricht-type fiscal rule, according 
to which the fiscal authorities adjust the government expenditures based on a target net 
government debt ratio; and a Godley-Minsky fiscal rule, which links government 
expenditures with private indebtedness following a counter-cyclical logic. Simulation 
analysis illustrates that the Maastricht-type fiscal rule is destabilising while the Godley-
Minsky fiscal rule is stabilising. Apart from supporting the view that counter-cyclical fiscal 
policy has positive effects on the stabilisation of output, this result suggests that counter-
cyclical fiscal policy is also conducive to the stabilisation of government indebtedness. 
Moreover, it is shown that the paradox of debt can apply to the government sector: the 
more the fiscal authorities attempt to target a specific government debt ratio, by adjusting 
the government expenditures, the more this ratio destabilises.  
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 lays out the structure of the model. Section 
3 explores the interaction between private sector’s propensity to spend and net private 
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indebtedness when the target net private debt-to-income ratio and government 
expenditures are exogenous. Section 4 endogenises the target net private debt-to-income 
ratio and studies how Godley-Minsky cycles can arise. It also examines the implications of 
this endogeneity for instability. Section 5 introduces fiscal rules and analyses their 
(de)stabilising effects. Section 6 summarises and concludes.  
 
2. Structure of the model  
 
Table 1 portrays the transactions matrix of our three-sector economy. National 
accounting implies: 
 
MXGICY   (1) 
PP rDTYY   (2) 
CYS P   (3) 
PPP YPBD 
  (4) 
GGG rDTGBD 
  (5) 
 GPFF DDrMXBD   (6) 
0 FGP DDD  (7) 
  0 FGPFGP BBBDDD   (8) 
 
where Y  is the output of the economy, C  is consumption, I  is domestic investment, G  
denotes primary government expenditures, X  denotes exports, M  denotes imports, PY  is 
the disposable income of the private sector, S  is private sector’s saving, P  denotes the 
total private expenditures ( IC  ), PD  is the net private debt, PB  is the balance of the 
private sector, GB  is the balance of the government sector, T  denotes taxes, r  is the 
interest rate, GD  is the net government debt, FB  is the balance of the foreign sector and 
FD  is the net foreign debt. The net debt of each sector is equal to its financial liabilities 
minus its financial assets. A sector is a net debtor when its net debt is positive and a net 
creditor when its net debt is negative. A dot over a variable x  is used to denote time 
derivative ( dtdxx / ).  
For simplicity, the following assumptions have been made: the interest rate is 
exogenously determined by the monetary authorities and is the same for both the private 
and the government net debt;3 the primary government expenditures refer only to the 
purchase of goods produced by the private sector; the price level is set equal to unity; 
there are no changes in asset prices and exchange rates that could affect the value of assets 
and liabilities (and, thus, the value of net debt).  
                                                 
3 The assumption that the interest rate is exogenous, and thus independent of the level of (private and 
government) indebtedness, seems quite restrictive. However, this assumption has been adopted because one 
of the purposes of this model is to show that indebtedness can be a source of cycles and instability even when 
it has no direct impact on the interest rates. Note, though, that the adverse effects that high indebtedness can 
have on the new debt inflow (by causing a rise in the interest rates) are implicitly incorporated in Eqs. (16) and 
(18a) below.     
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Table 1. Transactions matrix. 
Current Capital
Government expenditures +G -G 0
Taxes -T +T 0
Exports +X -X 0
Imports -M +M 0
Domestic investment +I -I 0
Private sector's saving -S +S 0
Interest -rD P -rD G -rD F 0
Change in net debt 0
Total 0 0 0 0 0
Private sector
Government sector Foreign sector Total
PD
 GD FD

 
 
Particular attention should be paid to identity (8). This identity reflects Godley’s 
financial balances approach.4 It states that the sum of the balances of the three sectors of 
the economy is equal to zero. This identity has been widely used by Godley himself and 
other economists to analyse the macroeconomic developments in various countries (see 
e.g. Godley, 1995, 1999, 2003, 2005; Godley et al., 2007; Zezza, 2009; Sawyer, 2011; 
Brecht et al., 2012; Wolf, 2012). The important implication of this identity is that the 
balance of one sector cannot improve without a deterioration in the balance of at least 
one of the other two sectors. Therefore, if, for example, the government sector desires to 
decrease its deficit to a specific level then the private sector and/or the foreign sector 
should be willing to accept a deterioration of their balances in an accurately offsetting 
manner. Otherwise, the intended decline in deficit cannot be attained. Moreover, since 
most components of the financial balances are also components of the aggregate demand, 
any attempt of the sectors to improve their balances may lead to lower output if the other 
sectors do not desire to experience lower balances.  
A distinguishing feature of the financial balances approach is the consolidation of 
households, firms and banks into one single private sector. This implies that in our model 
the transactions between households, firms and banks are not taken explicitly into 
consideration. Moreover, the assets and the liabilities of the private subsectors that are 
counterparts of the assets and liabilities of other private subsectors are netted out in the 
estimation of the net private debt. The net private debt refers, therefore, solely to the net 
liabilities of the private sector that are net assets of the government and the foreign sector. 
Although this consolidation is a great simplification with various limitations (see Dos 
Santos and Macedo e Silva, 2010 and Martin, 2012 for a discussion), it has proved quite 
useful in Godley’s projections and other empirical analyses that focus on the interaction 
between private sector’s behaviour, fiscal policy and foreign balance. Moreover, it serves 
the purposes of our simple skeleton that intends to capture the dynamics of a national 
macroeconomy by using a high-level aggregation.  
We have that: 
 
                                                 
4 For an analysis of this approach see Godley and Cripps (1983), Godley (1995), Zezza (2009), Dos Santos and 
Macedo e Silva (2010), Kregel (2011), Brecht et al. (2012) and Wray (2012).  
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TY
P
p

  (9) 
Y
G
g   (10) 
TY
D
d PP

  (11) 
Y
D
d GG   (12) 
 
where p  is private sector’s propensity spend out of its income,5 g  is the government 
expenditures-to-output ratio, Pd  is the net private debt-to-income ratio and Gd  is the net 
government debt-to-output ratio.     
Eqs. (13) and (14) imply that the taxes and the imports are proportional to the output 
of the economy ( 0, m ).  
 
YT   (13) 
mYM   (14) 
 
Eq. (15) shows that, for simplicity, the exports grow at an exogenously given rate, 
Xg . This rate relies on factors such as the economy’s structural competiveness and the 
income of the foreign sector, which are taken as given.  
 
XgX X
  (15) 
 
Godley argued that the private sector targets in the long run a specific stock of net 
financial assets as a proportion of its disposable income (a stock-flow norm). He also 
postulated a formula which states that the balance of the private sector adjusts in order for 
this desired stock to be attained (see Godley and Cripps, 1983; Godley, 1999; Godley and 
Lavoie, 2007).6 In our model this idea is captured by the following equation: 
 
 PTP ddp    (16) 
 
In Eq. (16) TPd  expresses the target net private debt-to-income ratio. It is deemed 
that this target in not only set by the private sector itself. It is also set by the government 
and, most importantly, by the foreign sector that are potentially lenders of the private 
sector. For instance, it may capture the willingness of foreign investors to lend to the 
private sector of a national economy (households, firms or banks). Therefore, this target is 
affected by the decisions of both borrowers and lenders.7  
                                                 
5 For simplicity, in Eqs. (9) and (11) we use the private sector’s income after taxes, but before the interest 
payments.  
6 See also Martin (2012) and Shaikh (2012).   
7 Recall that the private sector can be either a net debtor (when the net private debt is positive) or a net 
creditor (when the net private debt is negative).  
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Formula (16) implies that the private sector’s propensity to spend increases 
(decreases) when the actual net debt ratio is lower (higher) than the targeted one (i.e. 
0 ). A change in the propensity to spend may express the decisions of both the private 
sector and its lenders. Importantly, although a change in the propensity to spend is the 
primary means through which the private sector can affect its net indebtedness, it may not 
have the desired outcomes. As will become clear below, the decision for spending affects 
the output of the economy and, therefore, has feedback effects on the net private debt-to-
income ratio.  
Eq. (16) can capture changes in private expenditures caused by capital inflows and 
capital outflows. For example, the inequality P
T
P dd   may reflect periods in which the net 
debt of the private sector is considered by foreign lenders as sufficiently small. In such 
periods the existence of a low perceived lender’s risk induces higher capital inflows that 
lead to higher private expenditures relative to income. On the other hand, the inequality 
P
T
P dd   may capture periods of capital outflows in which the lender’s risk is perceived to 
be high.   
Interestingly, formula (16) shares some similarities with the recent macroeconomic 
analysis of Koo (2013) about what he calls a ‘balance sheet recession’. In this analysis Koo 
makes a distinction between periods in which the private sector maximises profits (‘Yang 
phases’) and periods in which the private sector minimises its debt (‘Yin phases’). In our 
model, the reduction in the private sector’s propensity to spend when P
T
P dd   resembles a 
‘Yin phase’ à la Koo. Similarities also exist between Eq. (16) and the formalisation in the 
model of Eggertsson and Krugman (2012) in which it is assumed that borrowers-lenders 
relationships are driven by a debt limit.  
Although Godley postulated that the stock-flow norm is exogenous, it is clear that 
such an assumption can be considered satisfactory only as a first approximation. In reality, 
economic units’ desired margins of safety, which determine the stock-flow norm, change 
endogenously during the economic cycle. Minsky (2008, pp. 193, 209) argued that during 
periods of expansion –when the outstanding debts are serviced without significant 
problems– the desired margins of safety of borrowers and lenders decline. This happens 
because the recent good performance of the economy and the favourable credit history 
induce economic units to accept financial structures that were previously assessed as risky. 
The opposite holds in periods in which the economic performance and credit history are 
not favourable.8 This endogenous responsiveness of the perceptions of risk to the 
economic fluctuations is in line with the empirical features of financial cycles (see Borio, 
2013). 
Although Minsky’s arguments primarily refer to the behaviour of firms and banks, 
they can be applied to any borrower-lender relationship and, therefore, to the financial 
relationships between the private sector of a national economy and its lenders/borrowers 
(the government and the foreign sector). Therefore, drawing on the above-mentioned 
perspectives, we postulate the following specification:  
 
   TPBPYYTP ddggd  201   (17) 
                                                 
8 See also Kregel (1997), Tymoigne (2009), Vercelli (2011) and Lavoie (2014, p. 446).   
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Eq. (17) states that when economic growth ( Yg ) is higher (lower) than a benchmark 
growth rate ( 0Yg ), the target net debt-to-income ratio of the private sector increases 
(decreases); note that 01  .
9 By endogenising the target net private debt-to-income ratio, 
Eq. (17) can be viewed as a Minskyan extension of Godley’s exogenous stock-flow norm 
for the private sector. In Section 4 it will be shown that this endogeneity can increase the 
amplitude of the cycles and can be conducive to higher instability.   
Although our model abstracts from asset price inflation, it should be pointed out that 
the postulated impact of economic growth on the target net debt-to-income ratio of the 
private sector is compatible with the role that asset prices play in Minskyan dynamics.10 
Higher economic growth can induce households to take more risky positions by 
increasing the proportion of their assets that is held in the form of equities or by 
increasing their investment in the housing market. The resulting rise in asset prices can 
lead to a higher target debt ratio either directly (by improving the state of confidence) or 
indirectly (by affecting positively various economic variables, such as consumption, 
investment, the profitability of firms and the value of collateral). Therefore, although our 
model does not explicitly incorporate asset price inflation, Eq. (17) can implicitly capture 
the destabilising role of asset prices, which is important in Minsky’s analyses.    
However, economic growth is not the only driver of the target net debt ratio in our 
model. According to Eq. (17), this target is also partially attracted by a benchmark net 
debt ratio, BPd , which depends on deep economic, institutional and social factors (e.g. the 
degree of financialisation, the degree of openness of the domestic financial system, the 
prevailing consumption and investment norms, the society’s perception of the role of 
debt, etc.); note that 02  . When 0
B
Pd , the private sector has a net debtor benchmark 
position; when 0BPd , it has a net creditor benchmark position.  
The benchmark net debt ratio is expected to change over a long-run horizon. For 
example, over the 1990s and the 2000s many advanced economies experienced a sustained 
reduction in the balance of their private sector (see, for example, Tymoigne and Wray, 
2014, pp. 107-112). It is very likely that this reduction partially reflected deep economic, 
institutional and social economic changes that took place over this period, such as 
financial deregulation, financial globalisation and the gradual prevalence of norms that 
were conducive to higher levels of consumption and debt. These fundamental changes 
probably moved the private sector in these countries towards a net debtor benchmark 
position.       
Overall, according to Eq. (17), the target net debt-to-income ratio depends on (a) 
cyclical changes in economic growth and (b) deep long-run economic, institutional and 
social factors. Following the distinction that Palley (2011) has made between Minsky basic 
cycle and Minsky super cycle, it could be argued that the cyclical changes effects are 
related to the Minsky basic cycle, while the deep long-run factors have to do with the 
Minsky super cycle which has a longer time horizon. In this paper, BPd  is deemed constant 
                                                 
9 For a similar formulation that focuses on the endogeneity of the desired margins of safety of firms and banks 
see Nikolaidi (2014).  
10 For recent Minskyan models that incorporate explicitly this role see Ryoo (2010, 2013a), Chiarella and Di 
Guilmi (2011) and Passarella (2012). 
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and, therefore, emphasis is placed on the dynamics linked with the basic Minsky cycle. 
However, future extension of this model could allow BPd  to change endogenously 
permitting thereby the combination of the Minsky basic cycle with the Minsky super 
cycle.11      
In our model the dynamic behaviour of g  is determined by fiscal rules. Fiscal rules 
have been widely adopted over the past two decades or so. These rules impose constraints 
on fiscal aggregates, such as government debt and deficit (see IMF, 2009; Schaechter et al., 
2012; Chortareas, 2013). We first consider a simple Maastricht-type rule which states that 
government expenditures (relative to output) decline when the net government debt-to-
output ratio is higher than a specific target ( TGd ). Formally, this rule is written as follows: 
 
 GTG ddg    (18a) 
 
where 0 . Note that the essence of this rule would not change if the tax rate was used 
as a tool instead of the government expenditures.  
We then consider an alternative fiscal rule that departs from the conventional 
approach since it places no limits on any specific fiscal aggregate. On the contrary, its 
rationale is that fiscal policy should stabilise the macroeconomy by increasing (decreasing) 
government expenditures when the private sector exerts contractionary (expansionary) 
pressures as a result of its attempts to reduce (increase) its indebtedness. Formally:    
 
 PTP ddg    (18b) 
 
where 0 .  
Eq. (18b) is consistent with the perceptions of both Godley and Minsky who 
emphasised that the government should intervene to offset fluctuations in economic 
activity that stem from the inherently unstable behaviour of the private sector.12 We thus 
call Eq. (18b) a Godley-Minsky fiscal rule.  
Combining Eqs. (1), (9), (10), (13) and (14), we get: 
 
  mYXgYpYY  1  (19) 
Solving the above equation for Y , yields: 
 
  gpm
X
Y


11
 (20) 
 
                                                 
11 For a Minsky model that formalises these two cycles in a single framework see Ryoo (2010). His model 
relies on a Harrodian perspective and concentrates on the interactions between households, firms and 
commercial banks.     
12 For a fiscal rule that relies on a similar rationale see Nikolaidi (2014). Interestingly, the Godley-Minsky fiscal 
rule is in line with Koo’s (2013) proposition that during ‘Yin phases’ fiscal expansion is necessary in order to 
avoid deep recessions.  
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The denominator in Eq. (20) must be positive (i.e. 0)1(1  gpm  ) to ensure 
goods market stability.  
Differentiating Eq. (20) with respect to time and dividing through by Y , gives the 
growth rate of the economy:  
 
 
  gpm
gp
gg
Y
Y
XY





11
1 
 (21) 
 
Using Eqs. (2), (4), (9), (11), (13) and (21), we get:  
 
 
  PYP
P
P dgrp
Y
Y
d
Y
D
d 

 1
1



 (22) 
 
Employing Eqs. (5), (10), (12), (13) and (21), we get: 
 
  GYG
G
G dgrg
Y
Y
d
Y
D
d  

  (23) 
 
Eqs. (22) and (23), in conjunction with (21), show that when the private and the 
government sector decide to spend less (relative to income) the impact on their net debt-
to-income ratios depends on whether they are net debtors or net creditors. When the net 
debt is positive, there are two counteracting effects. On the one hand, the decline in 
expenditures (i.e. in p and g) tends to reduce the net debt-to-income ratios. We call this the 
‘spending effect’. On the other hand, such a decline reduces Yg  which in turn places 
upward pressures on the positive net debt-to-income ratios by reducing their 
denominator. We call this the ‘growth effect’. However, when the net debt is negative, 
these two effects are mutually reinforcing. The reason is that a lower Yg  reduces the 
denominator in the negative net debt-to-income ratios making them more negative.    
Combining Eqs. (4)-(6) and (9)-(14), we can write the balances of the three sectors as 
a proportion of output: 
 
)1)(1(  P
P
P rdp
Y
B
b  (24) 
G
G
G rdg
Y
B
b    (25) 
  GP
F
F ddr
Y
X
m
Y
B
b  1  (26) 
 
Note that 0 FGP bbb .13 
Eqs. (16), (17), (18), (22) and (23) constitute a 5D dynamic system, which is 
reproduced below for convenience:14 
                                                 
13 This can be easily shown by substituting the ratio X/Y from Eq. (20) into Eq. (26)  
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  PYP dgrpd  1  (22) 
 PTP ddp    (16) 
   TPBPYYTP ddggd  201   (17) 
  GYG dgrgd    (23) 
 GTG ddg    (18a) 
 PTP ddg    (18b) 
 
The system has a unique steady state. The steady-state values (denoted by the 
subscript 0) for the state variables of the system are:  
 
B
P
T
PP ddd  00  
T
GG dd 0  
  BPX drgp 10  
  TGX drgg 0  
 
Note that BPd  and 
T
Gd  are parameters. At the steady state we also have that: 
 
XYo gg   
)1(0 
B
PXP dgb  
T
GXG dgb 0  
])1([0
T
G
B
PXF ddgb    
 
Prior to proceeding to the analysis of the dynamic macro system and its subsystems it 
is useful first to briefly examine the law of motion of private and government net 
indebtedness when economic growth is exogenous. This can be done by assuming that p , 
g  and TPd  are at their steady-state values, and thereby 0 gp  . Eq. (20) suggest that in 
this case economic growth is equal to the growth rate of exports (i.e. XY gg  ).   
Under these conditions, from Eqs. (22) and (23) we get:  
 
XPP grdd 
  
XGG grdd 
  
 
Therefore, the net private debt-to-income ratio and the net government debt-to-
output ratio are stable when rg X  . This implies that when economic activity is 
exogenous, the stability of the net debt ratios relies on the export performance of the 
economy and the stance of monetary policy. The lower the interest rate set by monetary 
                                                                                                                                  
14 When Eq. (18b) is utilised instead of (18a), the whole macro system is indeed a 4D system since 
Gd  has no 
feedback effects on the other state variables.  
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authorities and the higher the export growth of the national macroeconomy, the higher 
the likelihood that the debt ratios will stabilise.    
In the dynamic analysis and the simulations that follow it will be assumed that 
rg X  . This will allow us to confine our attention to the destabilising forces that stem 
from the Godleyan and Minskyan mechanisms described above. The parameter values 
used in the simulation exercises and their justification are reported in Appendix A.15   
 
 
3. The 2D subsystem: interaction between private sector’s propensity 
to spend and net private indebtedness 
 
This section analyses the 2D subsystem consisting of Eqs. (16) and (22). Our aim is to 
examine the dynamic interaction between private sector’s propensity to spend and net 
private indebtedness when the target net private debt-to-income ratio and government 
expenditures are exogenous. Hence, g  and TPd  are kept at their steady-state values (i.e. 
0gg   and 
B
P
T
P dd  ); Gd  is not necessary to be kept at its steady-state value since it does 
not feed back into the law of motion of Pd  and p . The following proposition holds.  
 
Proposition 1. Consider the system consisting of Eqs. (16) and (22).  
(a) If 0BPd , the steady state of the system is locally stable.  
(b) If 0BPd , there exists a parameter value 0
*  that satisfies the following properties: 
(i) the steady state of the system is locally stable for all ),0( * . 
(ii) the steady state of the system is locally unstable for all ),( *   . 
(iii) the system undergoes a Hopf bifurcation at *   (in other words, there exists a limit cycle around 
the steady state for some range of the parameter value  which is sufficiently close to * ) .  
 
Proof. See Appendix B.  
 
Proposition 1 suggests that when the private sector has a net creditor benchmark position, 
Eq. (16) does not produce destabilising forces: the stabilising impact of a change in the 
propensity to spend is reinforced by the associated ‘growth effect’ (see Section 2).16 On 
the contrary, when the private sector has a net debtor benchmark position, the likelihood 
that the system is unstable is higher the higher is the responsiveness of the propensity to 
spend to the divergence between the actual and the target net private indebtedness. The 
rationale behind this result is straightforward: when the net private debt ratio is higher 
(lower) than the target one, any attempt of the private sector to reduce (increase) its 
indebtedness by reducing (raising) the propensity to spend has an adverse (favourable) 
impact on economic growth. For sufficiently high values of  , this ‘growth effect’ 
                                                 
15 The MATLAB codes for the simulations of this paper draw on Nikolaidi (2014).  
16 Stability also arises in the marginal case in which the private sector is in a zero net debt benchmark position 
(i.e. 0BPd ).    
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dominates the ‘spending effect’ leading to instability. It is interesting to note that, as 
shown in Appendix B, *  becomes higher when the interest rate declines or the growth 
rate of exports increases. This implies that adequate monetary and trade policy can, until 
some limit, prevent the destabilising forces that stem from the behaviour of the private 
sector  
Figure 1 presents the limit cycle that is generated when 0153.0*    and 0Pd . 
Suppose that the economy is initially in phase I. Since TPP dd  , the private sector increases 
its propensity to spend, producing higher than steady-state growth. Simultaneously, net 
private indebtedness declines because the propensity to spend is not high enough. Phase I 
can be interpreted as a phase of recovery. As the net private debt-to-income ratio declines, 
p  continues to increase and eventually the economy enters phase II in which the 
propensity to spend is high enough to generate a rise in indebtedness. In this phase the 
economy continues to exhibit a high growth which, however, is accompanied by higher 
fragility. At some point, Pd  becomes higher than 
T
Pd . At that point the indebtedness of 
the private sector is conceived to be extremely high from the borrowers’ and/or lenders’ 
perspective. This causes a reduction in private sector’s propensity to spend. The economy 
enters a period of stagnation (phase III) where low growth coexists with rising net 
indebtedness. This rising indebtedness reduces further the private sector’s propensity to 
spend. Indebtedness starts declining only when the propensity to spend is low enough to 
outweigh the adverse affects of low growth on the debt ratio. When this happens, the 
economy enters a new phase (phase IV) where economic growth remains low (since Pd  is 
still higher than TPd ). However, declining indebtedness sets the stage for the recovery that 
occurs when Pd  falls short of 
T
Pd . When this happens, a new cycle begins.  
The cycles depicted in Fig. 1 could be characterised as ‘Godley cycles’, since they 
stem from private sector’s attempt to achieve an exogenous stock-flow norm by 
modifying its propensity to spend. These cycles are broadly in line with the empirical 
evidence provided by Koo (2013) according to which the saving behaviour of the private 
sector (motivated by the willingness to leverage or deleverage) was the principal driver of 
expansions and contractions in many advanced economies over the last decades.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
13 
 
Fig. 1. Limit cycle in the 2D subsystem; private sector in a net debtor benchmark position 
( 0BPd ); 0153.0
*   . 
 
 
 
Fig. 2 illustrates that when *  , the amplitude of the Godley cycles gradually 
increases and the economy becomes unstable.17 This happens because the propensity to 
spend responds strongly to deviations of the actual debt ratio from its target value. 
Therefore, the more the private sector and its lenders attempt to put net private 
indebtedness under control, by adjusting private expenditures, the more the private debt 
ratio destabilises. Arguably, this is a paradox of debt result. Although the adjustment of 
the propensity to spend seems to be a sensible behaviour for the control of private 
indebtedness, the resulting macroeconomic effects prevent the realisation of the desired 
indebtedness. 18     
                                                 
17 For a very wide range of parameter values above * , the discriminant of the 2D subsystem (evaluated at the 
steady state) remains negative. Hence, the system exhibits oscillatory instability.  
18 For the paradox of debt in the case of firms see Steindl (1976), Lavoie (1995), Hein (2007), Passarella (2012) 
and Ryoo (2013b).  
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Fig. 2. Dynamic adjustments of the 2D subsystem to a 5% positive shock in the net private debt-
to-income ratio; private sector in a net debtor benchmark position ( 0BPd ); 
0153.008.0 *   .  
 
(a) Net private debt-to-income ratio ( Pd ) 
 
 
(c) Target net private debt-to-income ratio ( TPd ) 
 
 
(e) Growth rate ( Yg ) 
 
 
(b) Private sector’s propensity to spend ( p ) 
 
 
(d) Fiscal variables  
 
 
 
(f) Financial balances (in proportion of output) 
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Since g  is constant in the 2D subsystem, net government indebtedness is exclusively 
driven by the ‘growth effect’: when economic growth is high (low) enough the net 
government debt-to-output ratio declines (increases). As shown in Fig. 2, this ‘growth 
effect’, which in the 2D subsystem is exclusively linked to the behaviour of the private 
sector, is sufficient to destabilise the net government debt-to-output ratio. Therefore, 
private sector’s attempt to achieve its desired stock-flow norm can destabilise public 
indebtedness despite the fact the government sector is passive. However, the constancy of 
g  has as a result that the government financial balance does not change significantly 
relative to the other two balances. Consequently, any deterioration or improvement in the 
financial balance of the private sector is almost entirely mirrored in the balance of the 
foreign sector.  
 
4. The 3D subsystem: endogenising the targeted net private 
indebtedness  
 
We now allow the target net private debt-to-income ratio to change endogenously 
according to Eq. (17); g  is still kept at its steady-state value. The following proposition 
holds. 
 
Proposition 2. Consider the system consisting of Eqs. (16), (17) and (22). Suppose that the steady 
state of the subsystem of Eqs. (16) and (22) is stable. Then, there exists a parameter value 0*1  that 
satisfies the following properties: 
(i) the steady state of the system is locally stable for all ),0( *11   . 
(ii) the steady state of the system is locally unstable for all ),( *11   . 
(iii) the system undergoes a Hopf bifurcation at *11    (in other words, there exists a limit cycle 
around the steady state for some range of the parameter value 1 which is sufficiently close to 
*
1 ) .  
 
Proof. See Appendix C. 
 
Proposition 2 suggests that the introduction of an endogenous change in the target 
net private debt-to-income ratio can transform an otherwise stable system of Pd  and p  
into an unstable one. Instability arises when the responsiveness of the target net private 
debt-to-income ratio to changes in economic growth is sufficiently high. Fig. 3 illustrates 
this in our simulations.19 The figure refers to a private sector that has a net creditor 
benchmark position (similar results arise when a net debtor benchmark position is 
considered). It can be seen that the stability properties of the 3D subsystem change as 1  
increases: although the system is stable for low values of 1 , it becomes unstable when 1  
is higher than 256.0*1  .
  
                                                 
19 For similar figures that show how changes in specific parameters affect the stability properties of dynamic 
systems, see Chiarella et al. (2012) and Nikolaidi (2014).  
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Fig. 3. Dynamic adjustments of the 3D subsystem to a 5% positive shock in the net private debt-
to-income ratio for varying values of 1 ; private sector in a net creditor benchmark position 
( 0BPd ). 
 
(a) Net private debt-to-income ratio ( Pd ) 
 
 
(c) Target net private debt-to-income ratio ( TPd ) 
 
 
(e) Growth rate ( Yg ) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(b) Private sector’s propensity to spend ( p ) 
 
 
(d) Net government debt-to-output ratio ( Gd ) 
 
 
 
(f) Government balance-to-output ratio ( Gb ) 
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The underlying mechanism can be explained as follows. In periods of low growth, 
when net private indebtedness is high, the deterioration in borrowers’ and lenders’ 
expectations induces them to target a lower net debt ratio than the benchmark one ( BPd ); 
recall that in the 2D subsystem BP
T
P dd  . Therefore, the difference between the actual and 
the target ratio increases, producing a greater decline in the propensity to spend (and 
therefore in economic growth) compared to the 2D subsystem. Inversely, in periods of 
high growth, in which net private indebtedness is low, the favourable expectations due to 
the good performance of the economy make the perceived risk lower. This leads to a 
higher target net debt ratio than the benchmark one and, hence, to a more important rise 
in the propensity to spend. This results in higher economic growth. The greater 
fluctuations in both the propensity to spend and economic growth are reflected in the law 
of motion of the net debt ratio. If 1  is sufficiently high, these fluctuations ultimately lead 
to instability.    
When 256.0*11  , the endogeneity of the target net private debt-to-income ratio 
gives rise to a limit cycle. This is shown in Fig. 4 where the magnitude of the destabilising 
forces, associated with the changes in euphoria and the perceptions of risk, is slightly 
lower than the magnitude that is necessary to produce instability. The persistent cycles 
that are generated reveal that an otherwise stable Godley system can exhibit cyclical 
behaviour when it is combined with the Minskyan endogeneity of the stock-flow norm.  
 
Fig. 4. Limit cycle in the 3D subsystem; private sector in a net creditor benchmark position 
( 0BPd ); 256.0
*
11  . 
 
 
 
5. The 5D system: introducing fiscal rules  
 
We now turn to examine how the stability of the macro system changes when fiscal rules 
are introduced. Fig. 5 illustrates the dynamic adjustment of the system when fiscal 
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authorities adopt a Maastricht-type fiscal rule (Eq. 18a). Fig. 6 shows the dynamic 
adjustments when a Godley-Minsky fiscal rule is implemented (Eq. 18b). In both 
simulation exercises the parameter values that refer to Eqs. (16), (17) and (22) are the 
same with those used in the simulations presented in Fig. 3. Moreover, the same range of 
values for 1  has been employed and the case in which 0
B
Pd  has again been considered. 
This allows us to specify how the dynamic adjustments of the macro system are modified 
as a result of the introduction of fiscal rules.  
Consider first the Maastricht-type fiscal rule. Comparing the simulation results 
between Fig. 3 and Fig. 5, it can be observed that instability increases as a result of the 
implementation of this fiscal rule: first, for high values of 1  the cycles become much 
more intense; second, instability gradually arises even for low values of 1 . Intuitively, the 
following mechanisms are at play. Whenever economic growth is low (as a result of high 
net private indebtedness) there is a tendency for the net government debt-to-output ratio 
to increase. At some point during the period of low growth, the government debt ratio 
becomes higher than TGd . To guarantee fiscal discipline the government responds by 
reducing the expenditures-to-output ratio. This magnifies the contractionary effects that 
stem from the behaviour of the private sector: at a first place, economic growth is 
adversely affected by the decrease in g ; at a second place, this additional decline in 
growth enhances the deterioration in the expectations reducing further TPd ; other things 
equal, the divergence between Pd  and 
T
Pd  increases with destabilising effects on growth, 
private expenditures and net private debt. When the private sector has a net debtor 
benchmark position there is an additional channel through which the difference between 
Pd  and 
T
Pd  increases: lower growth resulted from fiscal stance places upward pressures on 
Pd . The inverse mechanisms are at work when economic growth is high. This implies that 
the Maastricht-type fiscal rule increases the amplitude of debt and economic cycles.20  
Importantly, the induced instability refers not only to the private sector but also to 
the government sector. Fig. 5 illustrates that, as time passes, the Maastricht-type fiscal rule 
generates significant fluctuations in both the net government debt-to-output ratio and the 
government balance (as a proportion of output). These fluctuations are much more severe 
than those observed in Fig. 3. This result stems from the amplification of the economic 
cycles described above. Therefore, in an economy in which the private expenditures 
respond to changes in net private indebtedness and the targeted indebtedness is 
endogenous, the currently fashionable debt brake rules do not only seem to destabilise the 
private sector but they may also be ineffective in ensuring fiscal prudence. Actually, a 
paradox of debt result arises: the more the fiscal authorities attempt to target a specific 
government debt ratio, by adjusting the government expenditures, the more this ratio 
destabilises.21  
                                                 
20 For the destabilising effects of Maastricht-type fiscal rules see also Charpe et al. (2011, ch. 9).  
21 The potential application of the paradox of debt to the government sector has been briefly pointed out by 
Lavoie (2014, p. 19).  
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Fig. 5. Dynamic adjustments of the 5D system to a 5% positive shock in the net private debt-to-
income ratio for varying values of 1 ; private sector in a net creditor benchmark position ( 0
B
Pd ); 
Maastricht-type fiscal rule. 
 
(a) Net private debt-to-income ratio ( Pd ) 
 
 
(c) Target net private debt-to-income ratio ( TPd ) 
 
 
(e) Growth rate ( Yg ) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(b) Private sector’s propensity to spend ( p ) 
 
 
(d) Net government debt-to-output ratio ( Gd ) 
 
 
(f) Government balance-to-output ratio ( Gb ) 
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On the other hand, the Godley-Minsky fiscal rule suggested here is capable of 
stabilising both the private economy and the government sector for high values of 1 . Fig. 
6 indicates this. After some fluctuations in the initial periods (which are much less intense 
than the fluctuations in Fig. 5) all macro variables converge towards their steady-state 
values. Economically, this can be explained as follows. When economic growth is low due 
to high net private indebtedness, the implementation of the Godley-Minsky fiscal rule 
produces a rise in the government expenditures-to-output ratio. This has favourable 
effects on economic growth since it tends to reduce the divergence between Pd  and 
T
Pd  
by placing upward pressures on TPd . As alluded to before, the reduction of this divergence 
is conducive to stability. In high-growth phases the government expenditures-to-output 
ratio falls, slowing down the economic growth that is caused by the behaviour of the 
private sector. This again tends to reduce the difference between Pd  and 
T
Pd  via the 
impact on TPd . Consequently, fiscal policy reduces the amplitude of the cycles by 
suppressing the destabilising forces that stem from the endogenous changes in the desired 
margins of safety. This is also beneficial to the government sector itself. Since after some 
periods the fluctuations in economic growth decline, the same happens to the government 
balance (as a proportion of output) and the net government debt ratio. Therefore, 
although at a first place there might be some adverse developments in the fiscal 
performance, in the medium to the long run fiscal prudence is safeguarded under the 
Godley-Minsky fiscal rule.      
Interestingly enough, the simulations in Fig. 6 indicate that the Godley-Minsky fiscal 
rule is not stabilising when 1  is close to zero, i.e. when the target net debt ratio of the 
private sector does not change endogenously (or changes only slightly). The reason is that 
Fig. 6 refers to a private sector that has a net creditor benchmark position. As mentioned 
above, in this case a higher (lower) growth rate places upward (downward) pressures on 
the net debt ratio. Hence, the counter-cyclical effects of the Godley-Minsky fiscal rule are 
not conducive to stability. This, however, does not hold when the private sector has a net 
debtor benchmark position ( 0BPd ). In this case, the Goldey-Minsky fiscal rule is 
stabilising even when 1  is close to zero.    
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Fig. 6. Dynamic adjustments of the 5D system to a 5% positive shock in the net private debt-to-
income ratio for varying values of 1 ; private sector in a net creditor benchmark position ( 0
B
Pd ); 
Godley-Minsky fiscal rule. 
 
(a) Net private debt-to-income ratio ( Pd ) 
 
 
(c) Target net private debt-to-income ratio ( TPd ) 
 
 
(e) Growth rate ( Yg ) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(b) Private sector’s propensity to spend ( p ) 
 
 
(d) Net government debt-to-output ratio ( Gd ) 
 
 
(f) Government balance-to-output ratio ( Gb ) 
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Fig. 7 compares the relationship of the net private debt ratio with the net government 
debt ratio between an economy that implements the Maastricht-type rule and an economy 
in which government expenditures change according to the Godley-Minsky rule. It can be 
observed that the nature of the debt cycles is very different in these economies. In the 
economy that implements the Maastricht-type rule, there are periods in which both the 
private and the government net debt ratio decline. However, these ostensibly tranquil 
periods of declining net indebtedness are followed by periods where both the government 
and the private net debt ratio increase. Contrariwise, under the Godley-Minsky fiscal rule 
the relationship between the two ratios is always inverse (before the steady state is 
reached): in periods in which the net private debt ratio declines (increases), the net 
government debt ratio increases (declines). This is the consequence of the attempts of the 
fiscal authorities to mitigate the contractionary (expansionary) effects that stem for the 
desire of the private sector to reduce (increase) its indebtedness. 
 
Fig. 7. Relationship between net private and net government indebtedness in the 5D system; 
private sector in a net creditor benchmark position ( 0BPd ); 6.01  .
 
(a) Maastricht-type fiscal rule 
 
 
b) Godley-Minsky fiscal rule 
 
 
 
 
6. Conclusion 
 
This paper developed a simple macrodynamic model that synthesises certain aspects of 
Godley’s and Minsky’s analytical frameworks. Using this model, it was first shown that 
Godley debt cycles are likely to arise as a result of the responsiveness of private sector’s 
propensity to spend to divergences between the actual and the target net private debt ratio 
(the stock-flow norm). These cycles are generated when the private sector has a net debtor 
benchmark position. Instability emerges when the responsiveness of the propensity to 
spend is sufficiently high. This is a paradox of debt result: the more the private sector and 
its lenders attempt to put net private indebtedness under control, by adjusting private 
expenditures, the more the net private debt ratio destabilises. This result is associated with 
the economic growth consequences of this adjustment which have destabilising feedback 
effects on net private indebtedness. 
Furthermore, the analysis indicated that when the target net private debt ratio is 
allowed to change endogenously via a Minsky mechanism an otherwise stable macro 
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system can be transformed into an unstable one. This happens, in particular, when the 
expectations that determine the stock-flow norm are highly sensitive to the changes in 
economic performance. Godley-Minsky debt cycles can also be generated. These cycles 
are driven by the changes in euphoria and the perceptions of risk that affect Godley’s 
stock-flow norm.  
Lastly, the paper examined the implications of the developed framework for fiscal 
policy. The (de)stabilising effects of two different fiscal rules were compared. The first 
rule is a Maastricht-type fiscal rule according to which the government expenditures-to-
output ratio decreases (increases) when the net government debt ratio is higher (lower) 
than a target level. The second rule is a Godley-Minsky fiscal rule which states that fiscal 
authorities should increase (decrease) government expenditures when the private sector 
attempts to decrease (increase) its indebtedness. Simulation analysis illustrated that the 
Maastricht-type fiscal rule is destabilsing while the Godley-Minsky fiscal rule is stabilising. 
The paradox of debt appears to apply to the government sector: the more the fiscal 
authorities attempt to target a specific government debt ratio, by adjusting the government 
expenditures, the more this ratio destabilises. Moreover, the two fiscal rules produced 
different results as far the relationship between the private and the government net debt 
ratio is concerned. Under the Maastricht-type fiscal rule, there are periods in which these 
debt ratios move together producing both tranquil times of decreasing indebtedness and 
turbulent times of increasing indebtedness. Under the Godley-Minsky fiscal rule, the net 
government debt ratio always moves inversely with the net private debt ratio and, 
therefore, there are no periods in which private and government net indebtedness both 
increase.   
The model of this paper and the results presented above bring to the fore the 
importance of Godley’s and Minsky’s perspectives on the inherent instability of the 
macroeconomy, the generation of debt cycles and the stabilising role of fiscal policy. 
Based on these perspectives, the paper provided a new look at the dynamics of the 
modern macroeconomies in which the financial relationships between the private, the 
government and the foreign sector play a crucial role. An important line of research would 
be to combine the Godley-Minsky cycles produced here –which focus on the role of 
sectoral debt– with the traditional Goodwin cycles –that concentrate on the intra-private 
sector relationships and the role of income distribution.22  
 
 
  
                                                 
22 For the presentation of the Goodwin cycles and the combination of Goodwin’s model with Minskyan 
dynamics see Keen (1995), Sordi and Vercelli (2014) and Stockhammer and Michell (2014).   
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Appendix A. Parameter values in the simulations 
 
Parameter Value Justification
Interest rate (r ) 0.025 This is close to 0.026, which is the unweighted average of the long-term 
real interest rate for 35 EU and non-EU countries over the period 1961-
2014 (source: AMECO; code: ILRV).
Growth rate of exports (g X) 0.03 This is slightly higher than the interest rate, ensuring stability when the laws 
of motion of debt ratios are examined in isolation (see Section 2). 
Taxes-to-output ratio (τ ) 0.35 This is close to 0.34, which is the uweighted average of the total tax 
burden (excluding imputed social contributions), as a proportion of 
GDP, for 34 EU and non-EU countries over the period 1975-2014 
(source: AMECO; code: UTAT).  
Imports-to-output ratio (m ) 0.4 This is close to 0.41 which is the uweighted average of the imports-to-
GDP ratio for 43 EU and non-EU countries over the period 1960-2014 
(source: AMECO; codes: UMGS, UVGD).  
Target net government debt-to-
output ratio (d G
T
)
0.3 This is equal to 0.6 minus 0.3; 0.6 is the maximum accepted value of the 
gross public debt ratio according to the Maastricht criteria; 0.3 is the 
average difference between gross and net goveernment debt ratio in 27 
advanced countries over the period 2001-2012 (source: IMF, World 
Economic Outlook Database, April 2015 edition).
Benchmark net private debt-to-
income ratio (d P
B
); net debtor 
position
0.2 This has been chosen such that the steady-state private balance (b P0 ) is 
slightly lower than 0.
Benchmark net private debt-to-
income ratio (d P
B
); net creditor 
position
-0.2 This has been chosen such that the steady-state private balance (b P0 ) is 
slightly higher than 0.
Responsiveness of the private 
sector's propensity to spend to 
the gap between the target and 
the actual debt ratio (λ )
0.0153 (Fig. 1) 
0.08 (Fig. 2)   
0.05 (Figs. 3-7)
See the analysis of Figs. 1 and 2 in Section 3. In Figs. 3, 5, 6 and 7, λ has 
been chosen such that the values of the endogenous variables remain 
within a relatively reasonable range when a 5% positive shock in the net 
private debt-to-income ratio is imposed on the system.  
Responsiveness of the private 
sector's target debt ratio to the 
gap between the actual and the 
benchmark growth rate (θ 1 )
0.2617 (Fig. 4) 
0.6 (Fig. 7)
See the analysis of Fig. 4 in Section 4. In Fig. 7, θ 1 has been chosen to be 
higher than θ 1
*
, producing thereby an unstable 3D subsystem.  
Responsiveness of the private 
sector's target debt ratio to the 
gap between the benchmark and 
the target ratio (θ 2)
0.01 This has been chosen such that the values of the endogenous variables 
remain within a relatively reasonable range when a 5% positive shock in 
the net private debt-to-income ratio is imposed on the system.
Reaction parameter in the 
Maastricht-type fiscal rule (μ ) 
0.04 This has been chosen such that the values of the endogenous variables 
remain within a relatively reasonable range when a 5% positive shock in 
the net private debt-to-income ratio is imposed on the system.
Reaction parameter in the 
Godley-Minsky fiscal rule (κ )
0.08 This has been chosen such that the values of the endogenous variables 
remain within a relatively reasonable range when a 5% positive shock in 
the net private debt-to-income ratio is imposed on the system.
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Appendix B. Proof of Proposition 1 
 
The Jacobian matrix of the 2D subsystem evaluated at the steady state is: 
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where: 
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We have that: 
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Proof of (a):  
 
If 0BPd , then 0)( 2 DJTr ; recall that rg X   and   011 00  gpm   (see 
Section 2). Since )( 2DJDet  is always positive, the steady state is locally stable. □ 
 
Proof of (b-i):  
 
If 0BPd , then 0)( 2 DJTr  for sufficiently low values of  . By setting 
0)( 2 DJTr , we can find the critical value for   below which 0)( 2 DJTr :  
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Therefore, the steady state is locally stable when *  . □ 
 
 
Proof of (b-ii):  
 
If 0BPd  and 
*  , we have that 0)( 2 DJTr . Hence, since )( 2DJDet  is always 
positive, the steady state is locally unstable. □ 
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Proof of (b-iii):  
 
At *  , 0)( 2 DJDet  and 0)( 2 DJTr . This implies that the characteristic 
equation of the system has a pair of pure imaginary roots. Furthermore, we have that: 
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This means that at *   the real part of the imaginary roots is not stationary with 
respect to changes in  (note that the trace of the Jacobian matrix represents the real part 
of the roots). Therefore, the conditions for the existence of a Hopf bifurcation point are 
satisfied. □ 
 
 
Appendix C. Proof of Proposition 2 
 
The Jacobian matrix of the 3D subsystem, evaluated at the steady state, is: 
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The characteristic equation of the system is: 
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We have that: 
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Since we consider the case in which the steady state of the 2D subsystem is stable, we 
have that   02 DJTr and, hence, 0, 31  . Since 0, 42  , 1a  and 2a  are a negative 
function of 1 . By setting 01 a  and solving for 1 , we obtain 0211
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a . 
Hence, for 111
a  , 1a  is positive. By setting 02 a  and solving for 1 , we obtain 
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a . Hence, for 211
a
  , 2a  is positive. Note that 3a  is independent of 
1 . 
The expression for b  can be written as: 
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The quadratic equation 0b  has two roots: 
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It can be proved that:       044 342
2
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2
3241  aa . 
Hence, the two roots are real and can be re-written as:  
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The quadratic equation can be expressed as: 
 
   021 111142  bbb   
 
According to Vieta’s formulas, 0)()( 42324111
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It can also be proved that 21
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bab    (the proof is available 
upon request).  
 
Proof of (i):  
 
Suppose that 11
*
1
b  . If *11   , then 0,,, 321 baaa . Therefore, according to the 
Routh-Hurwitz conditions, the steady state of the 3D subsystem is locally stable. □ 
 
Proof of (ii):  
 
Suppose that 11
*
1
b  . If *11   , then we have two cases. In the first case, 
2
11
b  , implying that 0b . In the second case, 211
b  , implying that 0b  and 
0, 21 aa . Therefore, in both cases at least one of the Routh-Hurwitz conditions is 
violated and, hence, the steady state of the 3D subsystem is locally unstable. □ 
 
Proof of (iii):  
 
Suppose that 11
*
1
b  . At *11   , it holds that 0,, 321 aaa  and 0b . This 
implies that the characteristic equation has a pair of pure imaginary roots and a negative 
real root. Therefore, to prove that *1  is a Hopf bifurcation point, it suffices to show that 
0
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1
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, where   is the real part of the two imaginary roots. Asada and Semmler 
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(1995) have proved that the condition 0
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We have that: 
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